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SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-SEC RULE 1OB-5-INSIDER
DUTY-THIRD PARTY DUTY-The Supreme Court of the United
States has held that before a third party inherits a duty to disclose
material non-public information or refrain from trading, an insider
must first breach a specific fiduciary duty.
Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 103 S. Ct. 3255
(1983).
In 1973, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investi-
gated the role of Raymond Dirks, an officer in a New York broker-
dealer firm, in alleged security law violations.1 Dirks' firm analyzed
insurance companies for investment purposes. Dirks had learned
from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of
America, that Equity Funding was fraudulently inflating its as-
sets.3 Secrist then urged Dirks to investigate, verify, and disclose
the fraud.4 Dirks conducted his own investigation and discovered
fraud.' He then informed the Wall Street Journal which, fearing a
libel action, refused to publish the information.'
During the course of Dirks' investigation, Equity Funding stock
fell from $26 per share to $15 per share and the New York Stock
Exchange halted trading in the stock on March 27, 1973. 7 Subse-
quently, California insurance authorities impounded Equity Fund-
ing's records and discovered the fraud.' This prompted the SEC to
file a complaint against Equity Funding and the Wall Street Jour-
nal to publish a front page story.9
1. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3258 (1983).
2. Id. at 3258.
3. Id.
4. Id. Secrist informed Dirks that various regulatory agencies had failed to act upon
reports by Secrist and others. Id.
5. Id. at 3258 & nn.1 & 2. Dirks openly discussed the fraud with clients and other
investors. Relying on this information, Dirks' clients and others liquidated their holdings.
Five investors liquidated a total of $16 million worth of stock. It was unclear whether Dirks
received any compensation or brokerage business from those to whom he conveyed the in-
formation. Id. See Dirks v. SEC, 21 S.E.C. 1401, 1402-06 (1981).
6. 103 S. Ct. at 3258. Dirks contacted the Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles bureau
chief, William Blundell, who did not believe that such a massive fraud could go undetected
and refused to publish the story. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3258-59 & n.3.
9. Id. at 3259. Equity Funding went into receivership and 22 persons, including many
Equity Funding officers, were indicted. Id. at 3259 & n.4.
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The SEC held a hearing before an administrative law judge in
order to determine what role Dirks played in the exposure of the
fraud. 10 The SEC found that although neither Dirks nor his firm
traded in Equity Funding stock, Dirks had repeated information
concerning the fraud to investors who then sold their Equity Fund-
ing stock in violation of SEC regulations and relevant statutes.11
Since Dirks had helped to expose the fraud, however, he was only
censured by the SEC. 2
10. Id. at 3259.
11. Id. at 3258-59. The SEC concluded: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of their motiva-
tion or occupation-come into possession of material 'information that they know is confi-
dential and know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they must either publicly
disclose that information or refrain from trading." Id. at 3259. Dirks was indicted for violat-
ing section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982), which provides in
pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful...
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
* * . necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1982).
Dirks was also indicted under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1982), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange . . .
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1982).
In addition, Dirks was found to have violated SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1982), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
12. 103 S. Ct. at 3259-60. While censure implies no punitive action, the actual effect
may be substantial injury to one's reputation. The SEC has broad powers to regulate dealers




Dirks appealed his censure to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit,"3 which upheld the SEC decision and en-
tered judgment against Dirks." The Supreme Court then granted
certiorari and reversed."'
Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court," noting that
there was no general duty of a corporate insider to disclose mate-
rial non-public information or to refrain from trading on such in-
formation until it becomes public.'" Further, he noted that there
was no derivative duty in a third party, the breach of which would
render the third party liable.'5 Instead, according to Justice Pow-
ell, an insider must breach a fiduciary duty before a third party
inherited a duty to disclose the information or to refrain from
trading in the security.'9
Justice Powell arrived at his conclusion by relying on several
landmark cases, most notably Chiarella v. United States,20 in
which it was held that there was no general duty to disclose mate-
rial information before trading.2' In Chiarella, Justice Powell ex-
plained, the Supreme Court recognized the SEC application of the
common law rule which places an "affirmative duty" on corporate
insiders to disclose.22 The SEC had adopted the common law stan-
dard and found that a breach of the fiduciary duty owed by corpo-
rate insiders to shareholders established the elements of a violation
of Rule 10b-5.2 1 Additionally, Justice Powell continued, the SEC
13. See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
14. Id. at 839. Judge Wright held that "the obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to
all those to whom they disclose their information before it has been disseminated to the
public at large", id. at 839, and that "Dirks had violated '[olbligations to the SEC and to the
public completely independent of any obligations he acquired' as a result of receiving the
information." Id. at 840.
15. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
16. 103 S. Ct. at 3260. Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined, dissented. Id. at 3268.
17. Id. at 3261. See Dirks, 681 F.2d 824, 837-40 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
18. 103 S. Ct. at 3260.
19. Id. at 3270.
20. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
21. 103 S. Ct. at 3260-61. In Chiarella, the court set forth two elements of a Rule 10b-
5 violation: "(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information in-
tended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a
corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure." 445
U.S. at 227.
22. 103 S. Ct. at 3260. Corporate insiders are usually considered to be officers, direc-
tors, or controlling stockholders in a corporation. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907 (1961) (applying the common law standard of fiduciary duty owed by persons other than
corporate insiders).
23. 103 S. Ct. at 3260. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 907.
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applied the same standard to individuals other than corporate in-
siders who would also be required to either disclose material non-
public information or refrain from trading.24 The Chiarella Court
held that no duty to disclose arose from "mere possession" of ma-
terial information, but, rather, from a fiduciary relationship.25
Even where a fiduciary relationship existed, Justice Powell ex-
plained, there could be no violation absent the additional element
of "manipulation or deception. "26
The Dirks Court next addressed the SEC argument that a tippee
inherits the duty which a corporate insider owes to the corporate
shareholders.2 7 The rationale upon which the SEC based its posi-
tion, and which the Court in Chiarella had rejected, was the "in-
formation theory."2 The Chiarella Court had rejected the "infor-
mation theory" on the basis that, if adopted, it would inhibit the
significant role of market analysts.2 ' The Dirks Court again de-
clined to adopt this expansive interpretation of Rule 10b-5.
Justice Powell next addressed the need for some ban on tippee
trading, and recognized that insiders cannot use tippees as a shield
to hide their personal gain.30 The Court stated that those who
knowingly participate with a fiduciary in the fiduciary's breach
stand on the same footing as the fiduciary.3' The Court concluded
that the tippee's duty is derivative of the insider's duty and that
24. 103 S. Ct. at 3260. See, e.g., In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973).
25. 103 S. Ct. at 3260-61.
26. Id. (citing Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)). The Santa Fe court
held that there must be an element of fraud involved in order to prevent the unfairness
inherent in allowing certain individuals to act on information intended for corporate pur-
poses only. The Court in Dirks stated that" '[n]ot all breaches of fiduciary duty in connec-
tion with a securities transaction,' however, come within the ambit of Rule 10b-5 ....
There must also be manipulation or deception." 103 S. Ct. at 3261 (citing Santa Fe, 430
U.S. at 462). See also In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936
(1968).
27. 103 S. Ct. at 3261-62.
28. Id. The "information theory" is based upon the premise that all traders are enti-
tled to equal information before trading. This theory was specifically rejected in Chiarella,
where the court stated that "[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship between the
parties. . . and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position
in the market." Id. at 3263. (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33 n.14).
29. 103 S. Ct. at 3263. See supra note 17.
30. 103 S. Ct. at 3263. The Court held that it is "unlawful to do indirectly 'by means
of any other person' any act made unlawful by federal securities laws." Id. '(quoting 15
U.S.C. § 78f(b)). See supra note 11.
31. 103 S. Ct. at 3263 (citing Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951)). Mosser held that
a trustee is liable for the inside trading of his employees despite the fact that the trustee
himself neither obtained a profit nor exhibited any bad purpose. 341 U.S. at 272.
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the tippee's duty rests on improperly received information. 2 Thus,
the Court held, a tippee inherits a duty to a stockholder to either
disclose material information or to refrain from trading only when
the insider has breached his fiduciary duty and when the tippee
knows or should know that a breach has occurred."3
The Court next addressed the issue of whether an insider's "tip"
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. The Court defined "breach"
by first identifying the purpose of the disclosure or "tip.134 Relying
on the SEC's self-imposed standard, announced in In re Cady,
Roberts, the Court held that the insider must obtain some personal
advantage for a breach to occur.35 Absent a personal advantage to
the insider, either direct or indirect, there can be no breach of
fiduciary duty to the stockholders. The Court further stated that if
there is no breach by the insider, there can be no derivative breach
by the tippee."
In summarizing the majority position, Justice Powell reasoned
that for a Rule 10b-5 violation to arise, an insider must be in a
fiduciary relationship which creates a duty to disclose.3 7 Further,
the Court stated that the insider must breach the duty by an in-
tentional or willful "manipulation or deception" (fraud), which is
determined by the objective standard of personal gain for the in-
sider." To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would make it diffi-
cult for practitioners to decide whether their contemplated actions
would violate Rule 10b-5, and could lead to liability for every per-
son who may have come across inside information." The Court in-
dicated that allowing liability for innocent disclosures, and for dis-
closures made in the public interest, would eliminate the element
of "intent" and impose strict liability, a result not warranted by
the language of the statute.40
32. 103 S. Ct. at 3264. "Improper" is defined as a violation of a Cady, Roberts duty.
Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 3265. The Court indicated that not all "tips" were breaches of the duty. As
an example, Justice Powell pointed out that it may be unclear to both the insider and tippee
whether the information is material and non-public. Id.
35. Id. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 n.15.
36. 103 S. Ct. at 3265.
37. Id. at 3266-67.
38. Id. at 3265-67. The SEC argued that to determine a fraudulent purpose would
require the courts to read a party's mind. But Justice Powell held that an objective standard
would be used by looking for a "pecuniary gain or reputational benefit that will translate
into future earnings." Id. at 3266.
39. Id. at 3266 & n.24.
40. Id. at 3266. See supra note 11.
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Finally, the Court reasoned that because Secrist's purpose was to
expose fraud and not to achieve personal gain, he did not breach a
fiduciary duty. Therefore, there could be no derivative breach by
Dirks, and he was held not to have violated Rule 10b-5."
In his dissent, Justice Blackmum strongly disagreed with the
Dirks majority since, in his view, the holding further limited inves-
tor protection.42 Justice Blackmun especially decried the "innova-
tion" that an insider must act out of a desire for personal gain in
order to create a breach of duty.43 The dissent regarded Secrist's
actions in providing Dirks with the information as intending to
harm the purchasers of Equity Funding securities, to whom he
owed a duty to disclose.' Justice Blackmun further disagreed with
the majority's view that Secrist did not breach his duty because he
did not have the improper purpose of personal gain. Justice Black-
mun then asserted that stockholders other than Dirks' clients, as
well as future purchasers of Equity Funding stock, were unfairly
harmed.45 The dissent, therefore, concluded that although an in-
sider may not personally benefit, the corporation's stockholders
may nevertheless be harmed, and that a breach of duty still ex-
isted.4s Justice Blackmun thus refused to take part in the major-
ity's "limitation of the scope of an insider's fiduciary duty to
41. 103 S. Ct. at 3267-68.
42. Id. at 3268 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 3270. Justice Blackmun emphasized that Secrist provided Dirks with the
information in order for Dirks to disseminate it to his clients, hoping to trigger a steep drop
in Equity Funding securities, and to prompt reaction by the authorities. This is exactly
what occurred when Dirks disseminated the information to his clients and undertook his
own investigation. Justice Blackmun also believed that Dirks selectively disseminated the
information to his clients before informing either the authorities or the Wall Street Journal,
the effect of which was to enable Dirks' clients to mitigate their losses. The dissent consid-
ered important the fact that Dirks gave the "hard" story-all the facts-to those holding
Equity Funding securities. To others, he gave a vague set of facts, apparently to enable his
clients to dump their Equity Funding stock. Therefore, Justice Blackmun concluded that
Dirk's clients obtained an unfair advantage over all other Equity Funding stockholders. Id.
at 3268-69 nn.3 & 4.
45. Id. at 3270.
46. Id. at 3270-71. See generally id. nn.9-11. The fact that in most cases the insider
does benefit was thought not to be controlling by Justice Blackmun, who maintained that
"personal gain" was not an element of breach of this duty: "The duty is addressed not to
the insider's motives, but to his actions and their consequences on the shareholder. Personal
gain is not an element of the breach of this duty." Id. (footnote omitted). The dissent relied
on Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), which held that a lob-5 violation must include the
requisite scienter. One breaching the duty must know or intend that his conduct would
violate the duty. Id. Justice Blackmun maintained, however, that the scienter requirement
addresses intent, not motives behind the intent, and Secrist knew and intended that his




Continuing his dissent, Justice Blackmun described the majority
as having weighed the public benefit derived from Secrist's viola-
tion of his duty to shareholders against the harm caused to the
shareholders.4 8 Disagreeing with the Court's conclusion, he main-
tained that even if both Dirks' and Secrist's motives were pure,
neither they nor their clients should benefit from the disclosure.49
Acknowledging that the SEC had yet to establish an adequate pol-
icy for disclosure procedures, Justice Blackmun nonetheless would
have held that Secrist breached his duty to the stockholders, and
that therefore Dirks derivatively breached the same duty."
Violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may be discerned by
construing the language of the statute itself.51 It was agreed by
both the majority and the dissent in Dirks that scienter is required
as an element of any Rule 10b-5 violation.5 2 However, central to
the issue in Dirks was whether fraud is a necessary part of scienter,
without which there can be no violation of the rule. In examining
the pertinent statutes, it becomes apparent that one must both
possess the requisite scienter and intend to commit fraud in some
manner.
83
The dissent in Dirks, however, argued the opposite. Justice
Blackmun maintained that fraud is not a requisite part of scienter
and that simply intending the result or possessing the knowledge
that the result will occur is enough to incur liability.5' Justice
Blackmun considered fraud to be a reflection of the motives of an
individual, while scienter concerns itself only with knowledge or
47. Id. at 3272.
48. Id. at 3273. Justice Blackmun stated that the majority weighed the public benefit
brought about by the disclosure against the harm to individual stockholders, and stated that
the majority did not find that Dirks violated Rule 10b-5 because "the end justified the
means." Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 3273-74 & n.17. According to Justice Blackmun, the SEC presently informs
market participants that inside information cannot be traded upon before disclosure, yet
the Commission has failed to set standards concerning the required method of such disclos-
ure. The Court characterized this state of affairs as a "less than sensible policy, which it is
incumbent on the Commissioner to correct." Id. at 3273.
51. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
52. See 103 S. Ct. at 3265, at 3271 n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Scienter is gener-
ally regarded to be a mental state requiring intent or knowledge. See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). See also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980).
53. See supra note 11. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982), provides in part that
"it shall be unlawful. . .(a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud . Id.
54. 103 S. Ct. at 3271 & n.9.
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intent." Consequently, under Justice Blackmun's analysis, a Rule
10b-5 violation may occur where one's purpose is disinterestly mo-
tivated, but one possesses knowledge that the involved actions are
violative of the statute."6
Conversely, Justice Powell relied on the meticulous analysis of
the legislative history conducted by the Court in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder5 7 The Hochfelder Court had examined the Senate Re-
port and found that section 10(b) of the 1934 Act was directed to-
ward manipulative and deceptive practices-specifically, fraud.58
The Court quite correctly concluded that Congress did not intend
liability under Rule 10b-5 to arise unless a lack of good faith was
involved.59 The conclusion is inescapable, then, that while it is
agreed that Rule 10b-5 is a catchall for securities violations, fraud
must always be found. 0
It may be noted, however, that commentators have argued that
the philosophy upon which the Dirks rule rests stems from eco-
nomic concerns."1 These commentators would minimize the Court's
policy of narrowly construing the statutory language of Rule 10b-5
and maximize the Court's brief statement concerning market ana-
lysts. 2 From this latter statement, a theory has developed that the
Court arrived at its decision primarily because of its concern with
the economic welfare of the market.63 This interpretation, however,
reads too much into the majority's rationale. It is evident from the
Hochfelder Court's analysis of the legislative history of Rule 10b-5,
and from the Court's narrow construction in Chiarella and Dirks,
that the Court is attempting to place the onus on Congress to ex-
tend liability if it wishes to do so.
The next step in the analysis of Rule 10b-5 violations is to deter-
55. Id. at 3271 n.10.
56. Id. at 3271-72.
57. 425 U.S. 185.
58. Id. at 202. The Senate Report concerning the 1934 Act states that section 10(b)
was "aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to
fulfill no useful function." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong. 2nd Sess. 6 (1934).
59. 425 U.S. at 206. See also Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-74 (1977)
(holding that only conduct involving manipulation or deception is reached by section 10(b)
or Rule 10b-5).
60. 425 U.S. at 202-03. See also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222 (stating that what the
catchall provision "catches" must be fraud).
61. Note, Dirks v. SEC: A Gain for Dirks, A Loss for the Market, 35 MERCER L. REV.
(1984) 981, 999-1003. The authors base their argument on a sentence in Dirks which states
that the role of market analysts must be encouraged in order to preserve a healthy market.
Id. at 1000.
62. Id. See supra text accompanying note 29.
63. Note, supra note 61, at 1000.
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mine whether fraud actually did occur. The Dirks Court decided
that fraud occurred when a fiduciary duty is breached, 4 and thus
it becomes apparent that a duty must be established, and then
breached, before a Rule 10b-5 violation arises.68 According to the
Court, the duty in question-to either disclose material non-public
information or to refrain from trading-arises from a fiduciary re-
lationship.6 The issue in Dirks, therefore, centered upon whether
a fiduciary relationship is necessary to establish a duty.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun was clearly in favor
of imposing a duty on the insider, Secrist, to both the shareholders
and future purchasers of Equity Funding stock. 7 Under this stan-
dard, when Secrist disclosed the fraud to Dirks he possessed the
requisite scienter since he knew or intended that Dirks would dis-
close the information to his clients with the result that sharehold-
ers and future purchasers would be harmed. 8 This being the case,
Secrist breached his fiduciary duty and Dirks derivatively
breached the same duty.
6 9
Imposition of such a duty on an insider would require the appli-
cation of the "information theory" which was explicitly rejected
earlier,70 most notably in Chiarella, where the court relied on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and an extended line of cases in
order to establish the requirement that a fiduciary duty must be
present7' before a 10b-5 violation could occur. The pervasive ra-
tionale for this limiting element, however, rests upon the principle
64. 103 S. Ct. at 3261.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 3269.
68. Id. at 3268.
69. See supra text accompanying note 14.
70. See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-34 (rejecting the "information theory"). See
supra note 28 and accompanying text. See also Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 472-74. See generally
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (holding that a narrow interpretation of Rule 10b-5 is required,
thereby supplying an approach which limits the duty owed to those in a fiduciary
relationship).
71. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. The duty arises "because of a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence between them." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551
(2)(a)(1976). See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (transfer
agent has no duty since there is no fiduciary relationship); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939) (liability of an insider to the corporation based on a fiduciary duty); Strong v. Re-
pide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (fiduciary duty exists between corporate insider and shareholder);
General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1026 (1969) (no duty exists between purchaser and seller of stock if there is no fiduci-
ary relationship); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951)
(buyer is owed duty by seller in possession of material inside information only in a situation
where there is a fiduciary relationship).
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of stare decisis.72 That is, there exists a logical progression of cases
which led the Court inescapably to its conclusion in Dirks.7s Once
the Court had decided that a narrow interpretation of the 1934 Act
and Rule 10b-5 was called for by the statutory language and legis-
lative history, the requirement of fraud became and has remained
a necessary element in a 10b-5 violation. 4
The Court next held that for fraud to exist, there must be a
breach of fiduciary duty.75 Applying this analysis to the facts of the
case, the Court correctly concluded that Secrist did not breach a
duty to anyone with whom he had a fiduciary relationship since he
did not profit by trading in the stock or by fraudulently misrepre-
senting information.76 As Secrist did not breach a duty, Dirks
could not have been found to have breached a derivative duty
without the Court overruling years of precedent.
Justice Blackmun would obviously break with precedent by im-
posing on insiders and tippees a duty to the market itself." Based
upon his broad reading of both the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5, Jus-
tice Blackmun has advocated imposition of the "information the-
ory" in order to protect all market investors. 7 Nevertheless, Jus-
72. Stare decisis is defined as "[t]o stand by decided cases". The doctrine is based
upon the principle that law should be definite to enable one to understand exactly what is
proscribed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1261 (5th ed. 1979).
73. See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, Santa Fe, 430 U.S. 462; Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(narrowly interpreting section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 723 (lim-
iting class of persons who may bring suit in a lOb-5 action). See also Touche Ross and Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978) (requiring a narrow inter-
pretation of Rule 10b-5).
74. See supra notes 53, 59-61 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
76. 103 S. Ct. at 3265.
77. Id. at 3272. See also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245-46 (Blackmun and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting) (arguing that Rule lOb-5 does not require a "special relationship" in order to
create a duty); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 215-18 (Blackmun and Marshall, JJ., dissenting)
(arguing that intent or "scienter" is not an element of Rule lOb-5); Blue Chip Stamps, 421
U.S. at 761-62 (Blackmun, Douglas, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (stating that standing to
sue should be liberally granted in Rule 10b-5 actions).
78. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 28 for discus-
sion of the "information theory." Justice Blackmun has maintained that a duty exists to all
investors or potential investors in the market, in Chiarella stating that "[t]he Court contin-
ues to pursue a course, charted in certain recent decisions, designed to transform 10(b) from
an intentionally elastic 'catchall' provision to one that catches relatively little of the misbe-
havior that all to often makes investment in securities a needlessly risky business for the
uninitiated investor." Id. Justice Blackmun opposes such a course, asserting that a duty
may be breached without the actor gaining a benefit or profit. 103 S. Ct. at 3270.
Justice Blackmun's point is well taken, for harm could be caused to those with whom the
insider has a fiduciary relationship without the insider himself obtaining benefit. However,
the harm is not determinative of the issue since the profit test is the essential factor in
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tice Blackmun admitted in his dissenting opinion in Hochfelder
that the Court's opinion proceeded in a logical manner 7 9 Indeed,
he noted in his Chiarella dissent that the derivative obligations of
tippees had not been addressed bythe Court.80 In conclusion, then,
Justice Blackmun realized that the logical progression of decisions
could lead only to one logical result, that at which the Court ar-
rived in Dirks.
Justice Blackmun's approach constitutes a more practical point
of view than that of the majority. The former approach stems from
a perception that there is a certain unfairness in not extending lia-
bility under Rule 10b-5 to anyone who manipulates the market in
any way which would result in harm to any investor.8' The ap-
proach places great emphasis on the practical consequences of Se-
crist's and Dirks' acts-that is, the harm caused to purchasers.8 2 A
simple hypothetical situation has recently been proposed by one
commentator which illustrates Justice Blackmun's concern. 83 The
result of this plausible scenario would allow a tippee to escape lia-
bility while making large profits.8" Consequently, Justice Black-
mun's concern is very well taken. Yet, to find a general duty is not
consistent with the language of Rule 10b-5, nor does it effectuate
the legislative intent of the 1934 Act.85 Perhaps the Court did re-
fuse to "grapple with the difficult issues of efficiency and fairness"
and in so doing abdicated its responsibility as one commentator
identifying fraud. There still must be a breach of duty to those to whom a duty is owed.
Therefore, even if Secrist acted fraudulently in some manner, it would still have to be estab-
lished that he had a duty, based on a fiduciary relationship, to those defrauded.
79. 425 U.S. at 216. Justice Blackmun stated that "[tihe Court's opinion, to be sure,
has a certain technical consistency about it." Id.
80. 445 U.S. at 246 n.1.
81. See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 247-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Hochfelder, 425
U.S. at 216-17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (advocating extension of Rule 10b-5 to negligent
acts).
82. 103 S. Ct. at 3271. The "fairness" Justice Blackmun discussed is open to different
interpretations, however. While "fairness" may seem to be a good idea, it would also seem
too nebulous a term and present the courts with great difficulty in interpretation. See Eas-
terbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of
Information, 1981 SUP. CT. Rav. 309, 323-30.
83. The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HAiv. L. REv. 286, 293 (1983). The scenario
proceeds as follows: The president of a corporation tips a friend about an impending tender
offer to a target corporation. The tippee then buys and later, after the announced offer, sells
stock in the target corporation. Neither the president nor the tippee would be liable under
the Dirks rule. The president owes no fiduciary duty to the target corporation. Therefore,
the tippee could not breach a duty since any duty he may have is derivative. Id. at 293.
84. Id.
85. See supra notes 53, 59-61 and accompanying text.
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has suggested."s Such judicial restraint, however, is to be ap-
plauded. Issues such as "efficiency and fairness" reflect policy deci-
sions which should not be effected through judicial interpretation,
but rather should and must be addressed by Congress. As this
same commentator has concluded, these policy decisions are best
resolved by the legislative branch of government.8
In addition to being an unwarranted instance of judicial activ-
ism, to impose such a theory at this late date would overturn years
of precedent. Having once narrowly construed the intent of Con-
gress in enacting section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, the decision in
Dirks was predictable and inevitable.8 8 Given the trend of Su-
preme Court decisions, the principle of stare decisis and the pre-
sent composition of the Court, if there is to be a general duty owed
to the securities market, Congress must impose it.89 It is submitted
that Congress should take up the gauntlet thrown down by the
Court. The Securities Exchange Act was promulgated in 1934, over
fifty years ago. Rule 10b-5 was issued to enhance language written
in 1934. If Congress is not satisfied with the Court's present trend
and interpretations, it should act to change the law.90 Any amend-
86. The Supreme Court, supra note 83, at 293.
87. Id. at 294. The commentator succinctly stated that
[t]he legislative process is best suited to the task of evaluating the competing argu-
ments over efficiency and balancing them against the goal of integrity. Absent a legis-
lative solution, however, Dirks ensures that insider trading cases will continue to be
decided on the basis of anachronistic and misplaced notions of fiduciary duty.
Id. Yet this is not the final word on the problem of determining what constitutes a fiduciary
duty. Another recent commentator suggests that the Dirks rule has supplied an answer or
drawn a "bright line" between lawful and unlawful conduct. See Note, Rule 10b-5 and the
Fiduciary Doctrine: Dirks v. SEC, 4 J. L. & COMM. 127, 142 (1984), where the author con-
cludes that since fiduciary law is almost entirely judicially developed, the Dirks Court prop-
erly supplied an answer to the question of the extent of liability under Rule 10b-5, and
suggests that under the Dirks rule the SEC and lower courts may adjudicate such problems
based on a fiduciary theory. Id. at 139-42.
While it is true that the courts do have a guideline, it is not as bright as suggested above.
With the limiting rule of Dirks in place, the problem raised in Justice Blackmun's dissent
concerning harm to shareholders caused by one not in a fiduciary relationship to them re-
mains unsolved. See supra notes 46, 75 and accompanying text. Additionally, the hypotheti-
cal case suggested in The Supreme Court, 1982 Term illustrates a loophole allowing escape
from liability even where a profit was made. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
Compare Note, Securities, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 715 (1984) (concluding that Dirks sup-
plies a "guiding principle" to be followed but suggesting that congressional action is neces-
sary). See also Comment, Dirks, Defining the Scope of Rule 10b-5, 8 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 265
(1983) (concluding that new legislation is needed concerning trading on inside information).
88. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246 n.1.
89. Id. at 233. See Heller, Chiarellia, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus
Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW 517, 541-42 and nn.58-59 (1984).
90. It is incumbent on Congress to produce new legislation to address the issues with
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ment should not only address intentional conduct, but should ad-
dress negligent and reckless acts as well."' It is time Congress took
heed of Justice Blackmun's concerns and extended the duty owed,
not to the market as a whole, but to some point beyond a fiduciary
relationship. An attempt should be made to eradicate the present
"all or nothing" approach with more specific language finding an
intermediate standard.
Fifty years ago Congress decided to attempt to prevent those
with inside information concerning securities traded on the open
market from taking advantage of that information. While the
Court is unwilling to extend the reach of the current Act to all who
obtain inside information, Congress should be able to impose a
standard which meets the policy goal of preventing insider trading
while not imposing a duty on the market as a whole. To do so
would relieve Justice Blackmun of a heavy burden.
Joseph L. Luvara
which the Court has been confronted and seems hesitant to act upon. There is obviously a
problem since the conduct the SEC is attempting to regulate under Rule lOb-5 is beyond
the scope to which the Court is willing to extend the language. For criticism of the SEC's
authority to promulgate new rules to effect changes, see Heller, supra note 82. See also
Block & Barton, Insider Trading - The Need for Legislation, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 350, 367
(1983) (criticizing the fact that SEC proposed legislation does not specifically delineate what
constitutes unlawful insider trading).
91. For lower court decisions concerning reckless conduct, see Nelson v. Serwold, 576
F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978) (holding that Congress intended sec-
tion 10(b) to reach reckless conduct); Keirnan v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that reckless disregard for the truth is actionable under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 but recognizing that Hochfelder stated that the issue is still undecided). See
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
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